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Institutional Psychiatry-"The Self Inflicted Wound"
David L. Bazelon*
The focus of this conference centers on the human and civil rights of those
people who enter at -the "gate," pass through, and finally "exit" from the
world of institutional psychiatry. The recent APA Psychiatric News has
characterized the legal aspects of this phenomenon as an "explosion of men-
tal patients' advocacy litigation" flooding the state and federal dockets. One
psychiatric journal recently devoted an entire issue to "Psychiatry Un-
der Siege." One of the contributors described critics of psychiatry as lead-
ing the assault with a tract by Tom Szasz in one hand and the latest ap-
pellate court opinion in the other. (I wonder which court of appeals he
had in mind?)
On closer analysis it is fair to say that the problem is not so much with
the mental health disciplines as it is with the mental health professionals.
This is especially true in the case of those who no longer serve patients but
serve instead as employees of institutions such as the military, state hospitals,
penal institutions, schools and industry-to name but a few.
This brings to mind an experience of my dear friend, Dr. Leo Bartemeier,
an alumnus of Catholic University and one of this country's most dis-
tinguished psychoanalysts. Dr. Bartemeier has occupied a preeminent role
in American psychiatry and has influenced the education and training of
generations of young American psychiatrists. Beyond that, his intellect, wis-
dom and indomitable spirit of compassion and gentleness had an important
influence on my life and all those who were blessed with his friendship. In
1949, in recognition of his many achievements, he was nominated to the
presidency of the International Psychoanalytic Association. Because a
prominent American Catholic bishop was severely critical of Freudian anal-
ysis as contrary to Catholic dogma and teaching, Dr. Bartemeier sought an
audience with Pope Pius XII. As a devout Catholic he decided he could
not accept the presidency if the Pope were opposed to psychoanalysis. The
Pope granted his request for an audience and, after a lengthy exchange, the
Pope concluded the audience with the remark: "The Church's problem is
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not with psychiatry, but with psychiatrists. Go forth, my son, accept the
presidency and do honor to the Church."
I believe I have been uniquely fortunate over the past twenty years to
observe the workings of the behavioral science professions from within-as
well as from without, as an appellate judge. Based on those experiences,
I have become increasingly concerned that institutional psychiatry-espe-
ciaily in the state mental hospitals, the juvenile justice and the correctional
systems-has become the "self-inflicted wound" of the profession-a wound
which may prove fatal to the credibility of psychiatry.
The birthright of psychiatry won by the moral imperatives of the Pinels
and Tukes of ,the eighteenth century is in danger of being lost in 'the twentieth
to institutional psychiatry-"not with a bang but a whimper." To paraphrase
Rousseau, psychiatry born in a spirit of freedom is becoming shackled in
the chains of institutional psychiatry. Let me emphasize that when I speak
of institutional psychiatry my remarks are directed to all mental health pro-
fessionals who work in the institutional setting-the psychologist, social
worker, and nurse-to name just a few.
I emphasize psychiatry only because psychiatrists have been in the posi-
tions of greatest power and prestige in our society-within and without the
institutions.
As a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the past 24 years,
I have been exposed to many of the problems -to be addressed at this con-
ference. My involvement is not as an expert in the behavioral sciences, but
simply as a monitor of the decisionmaking process. That exposure has for
me underscored the lack of both professional and public accountability of
institutional psychiatry. My court has confronted such questions as who can
be morally responsible for a crime? Who can be ordered into a hospital
for compulsory treatment? What kinds of treatment can be imposed invol-
untarily and for how long? When may a patient be released and under
what circumstances? What standards should govern the imposition of soli-
tary confinement and other restrictive measures? What is the child's right
for treatment in the juvenile justice system? These questions present issues
of the balance of power between the state and the individual where the
stakes are the highest for human and personal rights. I would remind those
who suggest that such issues are not for judicial determination, that these
questions arise on petitions for redress of grievances. They may not prop-
erly be avoided or ignored. This is the business-this is the stuff of the
judicial enterprise.
The administration of the insanity defense is an example of the real prob-
lems involved in monitoring the expert decisionmaking in institutional psy-
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chiatry. In 1954 I formulated a new test of criminal responsibility in the
Durham case. That case held that an accused is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or defect. I hoped
that psychiatrists would willingly bring into the courtroom all the information
available on the determinants of human behavior. I believed psychiatrists
would tell us what is known and (just as importantly) what is not known
about -these factors. Durham's purpose was to irrigate a field parched by
lack of information and to restore to the jury its traditional function-to ap-
ply "our inherited ideas of moral responsibility" to those accused of crime.
I have no doubt that most of you are familiar with the struggle which
ensued in countless cases and opinions to fulfill the promise of Durham.
I am certain you also know that the promise was unfulfilled. The purpose
was not achieved. Despite our best efforts psychiatrists adamantly clung to
conclusory labels without explaining the origin, development or manifesta-
tions of a disease in terms meaningful to the jury. The jury was confronted
with a welter of confusing terms such as "personality defect," "sociopathy,"
or "personality disorder" taken-not from a page of Lewis Carroll-but
from the APA Diagnostic Manual! What became more and more apparent
was that these terms did not rest on facts and reasoning which were the
product of disciplined investigation, as required by Durham. Rather, they
were used to cover up the lack of relevance, knowledge and certainty in
the practice of institutional psychiatry-especially in understanding and
treating the socially deprived and disadvantaged groups who populate our
mental hospitals and penal systems.
Why is it that some experts on examination will invariably characterize
,the defendant (who, in the District of Columbia, is so often poor and black)
as an "anti-social personality"-with no mental disorder? Yet, on occasion,
when a psychiatrist independently represents the accused, the same defend-
ant is often diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, a mental disorder.
Is the conflict of opinion based on the inherent limitations of psychiatric ex-
pertise? Is there a more fundamental cultural bias inherent in the disci-
pline in regard to racial minorities and the socially and economically de-
prived? Is the difference based on the lack of resources, time and facilities
to provide the requisite information? The late, distinguished Dr. Winfred
Overholser, Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, clearly indicated to
me that lack of resources prevented the full investigation required by Dur-
ham.
Do the various diagnostic labels-explaining everything yet making noth-
ing understood-reflect an attempt to cover up the crucial conflicts of
interest between patient and institution? Why is it that in the hospi-
1974]
Catholic University Law Review
tal's written official report to the court of diagnostic conclusions, differing
viewpoints within the hospital's staff are not included. Attempts to obtain
records or tapes of clinical conferences have consistently been opposed and
thwarted by the psychiatric staff at St. Elizabeth's. What effect do ex parte
communications by the prosecutor, defense attorney, or police have on the
ultimate diagnosis? Is the evaluation of the patient affected by the fact that
the diagnostic facility is also the treatment facility for the patient held not
responsible? To what extent does political rhetoric for law and order af-
fect the decisions of experts relating to the commitment and release of pa-
tients? Why instead of the present ad hoc determinations are there no pub-
lished formal rules, guidelines and procedures to safeguard a fair and just
evaluation for every patient?
These are the questions which some courts-unhappily not too many-
have tried unsuccessfully to bring out into the open. Until these considera-
tions are adequately explored in the legislature or the courtroom, the insan-
ity defense will remain an empty vessel. Paraphrasing a thought I expressed
in the Brawner case: while we lawyers and judges are designing an inspir-
ing new rule for the insanity standard, the battle is being lost in the trenches
of institutional psychiatry.
The problems faced in the administration of the insanity defense also ap-
pear in the institutional roles of experts in civil commitment and sexual psy-
chopathy proceedings, in the right to treatment in juvenile and adult institu-
tions and the youthful offender's right to rehabilitation.
These cases starkly reveal the conflicting allegiances of the mental health
professional within the institutional setting-and the tendency to put institu-
tional interests above the best interests of the patients. Many of these prob-
lems arose in the 1950's and 1960's when psychiatry accepted the task of
dealing with the worst problems of our time--crime, poverty, racism, child
abuse, sexual psychopathy, alcoholism, drug addiction and others.
I recognize that psychiatry has important information on human be-
havior and expertise relevant to mental and emotional disabilities of many
people. However, the undertaking of psychiatry to alleviate those con-
ditions arising from socio-economic factors was doomed to failure. The
conditions were not amenable to its expertise. It was no substitute for an
informed public ready to "bear the burden, and pay the price" to alleviate
and eradicate the poverty, slums and discrimination which foster such hu-
man misery.
Once having entered this public thicket, psychiatrists should have recog-
nized that their "sacred trust" to the patient was being undermined by serv-
ing as institutional gatekeepers for society. The sign over the gates may
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well have read "Abandon all hope ye who enter here!" Psychiatrists did not
ask the crucial questions about the basis and relevance of their expertise
in this "brave new world" of institutional psychiatry. Nor did psychiatrists
acknowledge the inherent conflicts of interest between the patients and the
institution. Instead, psychiatrists ignored, repressed or covered up these con-
flicts-really serving institutional goals under the guise of fulfilling their ob-
ligations to their patients.
What is very disturbing about these situations is not that psychiatric mo-
tives are venal, or that conflicting societal interests may dictate different re-
sults-we are used to that in the law. But it is frightening that psychia-
trists as well as other mental health professionals have yet to confront these
conflicts out in the open. Failure to do so fatally infects the decisional proc-
ess. The ethics of the medical model governed by the Hippocratic Oath
were abandoned and replaced by the new situational ethics of the institution
where extraneous social, political and economic factors came into play. Case
after case makes clear that there are hidden agendas at work behind a fa-
cade of expertise. The predictable result has been public confusion about
what is the expertise of psychiatry and the role of the psychiatrist. This
confusion impairs the trust and confidence which are essential to the doctor
and patient relationship. Unless a patient trusts the psychiatrist, whatever
hopes there may be for the therapeutic process are diminished if not demol-
ished. There can be no hope for treatment and recovery when the psychia-
trist's allegiance is either in doubt, or, worse still, identified with one who
is seen as an oppressor.
Until psychiatry and other mental health professions address the dilemmas
of institutional psychiatry, legal challenges will continue unabated and public
mistrust will grow. I fully recognize that reliance on the law and courts
to bring about significant reform is reliance on a slim reed indeed. Courts
such as in the Wyatt case in Alabama can do little more than mitigate hor-
rendous conditions which violate our basic sense of decency. The real hope
lies in the mental health professions taking on the challenge themselves. Each
must scrutinize its expertise, fashion standards, rules and guidelines, and pro-
vide mechanisms of review. Each must monitor the decisionmaking process
in order to maximize patient freedom and dignity.
A good example was a recent NIMH panel on which I served that consid-
ered the broad moral, legal and ethical issues involved in psychosurgery.
Questions focused on models of the behavioral sciences and their applicability
to understand and treat violent behavior. Is violence a brain disease to be
treated with drugs, hormones or surgery? Is violence a learned phenomenon
to be treated with Skinnerian techniques of operant conditioning? Is vio-
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lence a psychological malady to be dealt with in psychotherapy? Is violence
a socio-cultural phenomenon to be dealt with by confronting the conditions
which foster violence? Which models, if any, fit which people and why?
Is psychosurgery a proven therapy or is it still an experimental procedure?
How do such models affect the practice of psychiatry and the human and
civil rights of people within mental and penal institutions? These were some
of the hard questions asked and debated. These are the kinds of questions
mental health professionals in institutions should be asking of themselves
concerning every patient. These considerations should be openly aired.
Records should be kept, files opened. Only then can criteria and standards
emerge to ensure what Tom Szasz would call "psychiatric" justice-not tyr-
anny.
None of us can afford to allow society the great cop-out of relegating
tough social problems to the experts. Society must understand there is no
magic pill, no medical prescription. The mental health professional has an
enormous responsibility to blow the whistle on the charade that institutional
psychiatry is alive and well and performing effectively the tasks assigned
to it by society.
It is no secret that I strain not to hide the raw facts of life behind legal
niceties and neutral rules. Whether intended or not, the law seems to screen
out the hard cruel facts on the rationale that they are irrelevant. I am
really getting to believe that irrelevancy is the cop-out rationale-a service
of the law, if you will-something we need to save us all from feelings of
very painful guilt and helplessness.
But we cannot, we must not, succumb to the temptation. To do so vio-
lates the ethical, moral and educational values we all share. As George
Bernard Shaw wrote, "The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to
hate them but to be indifferent to them: that is the essence of inhumanity."
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